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was the water pressure, but that the act was done in the manner
intended, and consequently the unexpected result did not constitute "ac-
cidental means." The dissenting opinion emphasized the fact that in
view of the disastrous result, the act must not have been done in the
manner intended, and that the amount of the pressure was unforsee-
able, unexpected and unusual, and hence was the "accidental means."
When one looks to the distinction drawn by the Court of Appeals 3
between the case at bar and the New Zmsterdam case, he finds merit
in the contentions made by the Court of Appeals and the dissent in the
principal case. The Court of Appeals pointed out that in the New
AImsterdam case the insured did nothing but that which he intended to
do, while in the case at bar the act quite obviously was not done in the
manner intended. Such an interpretation of the principal case seems
to be in conformity with the holding in the key case of United States
M1utual Accident dssociation v. Barry. D. A. W.
LABOR LAW
THE NATURE OF A STRIKE
The term "strike" is as old as organized labor. The problem of
defining it has often been before the courts. Many cases have turned
upon the question of the existence or non-existence of a strike.
Strike clauses in contracts have given rise to some litigation in this
area.' Surety bonds with saving clauses releasing the surety in the event
the loss involved was caused by a strike have made such a determination
essential.2 And cases have arisen with respect to employee group insur-
ance,3 strike clauses in insurance policies,4 demurrage costs during delay
caused by strikes,' and the payment of union strike benefits.'
Social legislation of quite recent enactment lends new importance to
the problem of dearly analyzing the strike concept. Some states have
statutes which provide that no employer shall advertise for help while a
strike is in progress in his place of business without stating the fact in such
' 6z Ohio App. 54, z8 Ohio L. Abs. 653, 5 Ohio Op. 406 (1939).
'McLeod v. Genius, 3 Neb. 1, 47 N. 473 (i89o); Consolidated Coal Co. v.
Jones & A. Co., 232 Ill. 326, 83 N.E. 851 (59o8); and see Is A.L.R. oo4.
3Uden v. Schaefer, ixo Wash. 391, S8 Pac. 395, 11 A.L.R. iooi (x9zo).
1 Roehrig v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 251 Ill. App. 434 (x9z9).
'Brous v. Imperial Ins. Co., z24 N.Y. Supp. 136, 130 Misc. 540 (19Z7) ,aff'd ZZ7
N.Y.S. 777, 223 App. Div. 713 (xz97).
'United States v. Russian Volunteer Fleet, 2z F. (zd) IS7 (19z7); Riviera Realty
Co. v. Ill. Surety Co., 165 App. Div. 114, 15o N.Y. Supp. 116 (1914); General Com-
mercial Co. v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., x98 App. Div. 799, 191 N. Y. Supp. 64 (192i).
' MARTIN, THE MODERN Lw OF LABOR UNIONS (1910), sec. 282.
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advertisement.' Several states have enacted laws which, in effect,
suspend the right io strike for stated periods of time following notice of
intent to strike.' Any action brought pursuant to these statutes would
necessarily involve a determination of whether a strike did or did not
exist. Similarly, the National Labor Relations Board must, unless it
finds that a cessation of work has been caused by an unfair labor practice,
determine whether or not a strike has been in progress when an em-
ployer's liability for the payment of back pay to reinstated employees is
in issue.9
The Federal Social Security Act" provides that no state unemploy-
ment compensation plan shall be approved by the board if benefits are
denied to workers who refuse to accept positions "vacant due directly
to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute." This requirement has been
met by all the state unemployment compensation acts." The inclusion
of "other labor disputes" may relieve the courts from the necessity of
deciding, in most cases, whether or not a strike is in progress. However,
Ohio and some other states have provided that "No benefits shall be paid
to any individual who has lost his employment by reason of a strike in
the establishment in which he was employed, as long as such strike con-
tinues; .. ."" The application of this provision demands a determination
in each instance of the existence or non-existence of a strike.' 3 These
statutes, and many others still being considered by staie and federal
legislatures with a view to preventing strikes in defense industries, make
the problem of clearly defining the term "strike" one of current interest
and improvement."
The following definition is consistent with the language of many
courts: "A strike is an agreed cessation of work-intended to be tem-
porary-by employees in an effort to obtain from their employer more
favorable terms or working conditions than the employer furnishes or is
willing to furnish."'" A perusal of strike definitions, by dictionary or
court, reveals more uniformity than difference."0 The acute problem
'W's. STAT. (19z7), sec. 103.34; and see OHIo GEN. CODE, sec. 896-3 (d).8
COL. ANN. STAT., 1930, secs. 347zc-347zv; MICHIGAN LABOR RELATIoNs Ac-r, sec.
9; MINNESOTA LABOR RELATIONS AcT, sec. 6.
949 STAT. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. 151.
1549 STAT. 62o, 4z U.S.C.A. 1301-1305 (1939 Supp.).
223 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 20-Z3 (936).
12 OHIo GEN. CODE, sec. 1345-6c.
13 United States Coal Co. v. Board of Review, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 5o9, 16 Ohio OP. 323
(1939); motio-n to certify denied, 13 Ohio B.A.R. 47 (1941). See Rhea Mfg. Co. v. Ind.
Comm., z95 N.W. 749 (Wis., z939), Note (1940) 24 MINN. L. REv. 287.
' H.R. z85o, 77th Cong., ist Sess.i H.R. z69S, 77th Cong., ist Sess.
is 24 OHIO JUR. LABOR, sec. 46.
'
6 lron Moulders' Union v. Allis Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 52 (go98); Jeffrey-
De Witte Insulator Co. v. N.L.R.B., 91 F. (zd) 134 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1937); Restful Slipper
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lies in the application of the several elements to specific combinations
of facts.
Locating the commencement of a strike is not so difficult as other
aspects of the problem. For the limited purpose of computing union strike
benefits, the day of the issuance of the strike order (or other day con-
sistent with union rules) may be marked as the day of commencement."
But this rule is limited to a single purpose. The actual cessation of work
is probably the most positive act that can be located to mark the begin-
ning of the strike. 8
Common to all definitions of a strike is the cessation of work.'"
If every cessation of work by employees were a strike the fact would be
relatively easy to establish and further refinement of the concept would
be unnecessary. But it is clear that every cessation does not constitute
a strike. The idea of collective action is inherent in the concept; the
cessation must be concerted action. One Ohio court has said: "The
refusal of one employee to work does not constitute a strike of employees
in the legally accepted definition of the term strike." 20 It may be safely
said that a strike must have the element of group rather than individual
action."
Every collective cessation of work by employees does not constitute
a strike. There must be an intent on the part of the "striking" employees
to resume the employment relation if and when certain demands have
been met. The mere cessation of work with no intent to resume the
employment relation lacks an essential element."
If it be established that the cessation of work has been brought about
by the concerted action of a group of employees, and that such cessation
is intended to be temporary, it becomes profitable to examine the causes
of the employees' action. Many grievances are not deemed strike-causes
by the courts. Men who refuse to work because of stormy weather 2 3
an employer's refusal to pay,2" fear of an epidemic, 2 hesitation to work
in a dangerous section of a mine,20 or the observance of a holiday2" are
Co. I. United States Leather Union, Ix6 N.J. Eq. 521, 174 Atl. 54.3, 545 (x934) ; OAKES,
THE LAW OF ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT (1927) sec. 308i RorwFViN,
LABoR LAW (1939) sec. 38; BALLENTINE, LAW DIcTIONARY (1930), defining the word
"strike."
" Supra, n. 6.
"GRIFFIN, STRIKE, p. 86.
' Supran. 16.
S'altzman v. United Retail Employees' Local, to Ohio Op. 6 (1937).
" Oeflein v. State, 177 Wis. 394, 188 N.W. 633 (1922).
' Supra, n. 2.
m Hagerman v. Norton, xoS Fed. 996 (C.C.A. 5th, goi).
2'Supra, n. I.
'Stevens v. Harris, 57 L.T.R. (N.S.) 6x8 (1887).
New York Coal Co. v. Pittsburg Coal Co., 86 Ohio St. 140 (191Z).
' Supra, n. 2 3.
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not "on strike." Grievances arising from working conditions within the
control of the employer and capable of being remedied by him have
usually been held to be strike-grievances, and cessations for the purpose of
curing such grievances or gaining shorter hours or higher pay have
generally been called strikes.2" If the grievance is such that a cessation
will cure it without further concessions or affirmative action, it is not
probable that the resulting cessation will be termed a strike.29 The
cases do not offer a rule-of-thumb by which strike-causes may be clearly
distinguished. It may be conceded, however, that a stoppage of work,
collective in nature and intented to be temporary, must be for the purpose
of enforcing a demand or adjusting a grievance if it is to be properly
called a strike.2 0
In Hamilton Tailoring Co. v. Clothing Workers, the determination
of whether or not a strike existed was based upon the existence or non-
existence of a trade dispute. 1 This approach does not differ in any
essential from the criteria already considered, but loose employment of
the terms "trade dispute" and "strike" has resulted in some confusion.
One Ohio court offered this: "A trade dispute can only exist where there
is a stoppage of work, or lockout by the employer, and an intention and
a reasonable expectation upon the part of both employees and employer
to resume the relation of employee and employer upon the satisfaction
of certain specified conditions . .,2. It is submitted that this language
describes a strike rather than a trade dispute. It includes a temporary
stoppage of work, an intent to resume the employment relation, and a
grievance which provides a reason for the cessation. While the cessation
of work is an essential element in a strike, cases which have turned upon
the existence or non-existence of a trade dispute indicate that such a
dispute may exist where no cessation of work can be found.2
The point assumes more than academic proportions when statutes
art framed in terms of strike situations rather than trade disputes. Un-
employment compensation statutes of the several states are of both kinds.
The Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act denies benefits to any
employee who is unemployed because of a strike. 4 In The United States
Coal Co. v. Board of Review 5 the court was confronted by a borderline
set of facts which demanded precise analysis of both concepts.. Pro-
' Cases cited supra, n. 16.
Supra, notes 43, 24, 25, z6, and 27.
0 Ro-rwEIN, p. 27 GRIFFIN, p. 20.
:' Hamilton Tailoring Co. v. Clothing Workers, 4 Ohio App. 495 (1935)-
'Park Hotel v. Union, 2z Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 257, 30 Ohio Dec. 64 (i959).
' See generally the comment in (1940) 6 O.S.LJ. 334, and cases cited therein.
OHIo GEN. COnE, sec. 1345-6c.
24 OHIO JUR. LABOR, sec. 46; and see note 23, supra.
tracted negotiations between the United Mine Workers and the mine
owners had delayed the signing of a new working agreement. The old
contract had expired and work had ceased. Here was a cessation of
work, a grievance or a demand, and an intent that the cessation should
be temporary'. Here was both a strike and a labor dispute. This court
found a clear distinction between the two ideas, and the opinion care-
fully marks out the limits of one and the scope of the other.
A labor dispute, reasoned the court, can e.xst without any positive
action by the disputing employees, but a strike can obtain only when the
employees have taken some positive, hostile action in response to their
state of mind. The cessation of work in the instant case was found to be
a "state of inertia," and not an adversary act which might properly be
described as the act of striking. A motion to certify the record was
denied by the Ohio Supreme Court, so this element of positive, hostile'
action may be usefully added as an essential element of a strike.
A word should be added relative to one element of a strike which
is implied rather than expressed in the characteristics considered above.
The cessation must be by employees. One Ohio court held that a legal
strike cannot exist unless there is the relation of employer and employee.3"
The concerted stoppage of work must be by employees or by those who
have been customarily employed."7
To locate the point of termination, the courts have applied various
tests. The intent of the parties is not helpful. In the view of the em-
ployer, the employment relation ends when the workers leave their
benches and he is free to hire on the open market. In the view of the
employees, a relation survives the cessation of work which gives them a
continuing interest."' But somewhere this striker-employer relation must
terminate, leaving the parties mere strangers and making further hostile
action by the strikers mere intermeddling with the employer's business."9
An early Ohio case4" is frequently cited for the proposition that the
employment relation ends completely when the employee ceases to
work.4 Thus viewed, the holding is at odds with later authority which
concedes that strikers are more than mere strangers to the employer.42
'
3Supra,n. 3!.
' Garment Co. v. Union, xS Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 353, 27 Ohio Dec. N.P. 675 (1913).
-O, r-,s, see. 309.
W 24 VA. L. Rrv. 66x, 666 (3938).
"° N.Y., L.E. & W.R.R. v. Wenger, 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 8IS (1 88 7); see also National
Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders Ass'n., 145 Fed. z6o (xqo6).
" MARTIN, sec. 25.
'Iron Moulders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 91 C.C.A. 631, 2o
L.R.A. (N.S.) 315 (C.C.A. 7 th, 39o8) State v. Personett, 220 Pac. 520 (923); Green-
field v. Central Labor Council, 104 Ore. 259, 207 Pac. 168 (19z2); Tri-City Central
Trade3 Council v. Am. Steel Foundries, 238 Fed. 728, 351 C.C.A. 578 (C.C.A. 7 th, 1916);
O.A:Es, see. 309.
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It is submitted, however, that the Ohio case says no more than that an
employee is a trespasser when he invades his employer's property.
If strikers take action showing that they have no intention of re-
turning to their former employment, the relation (and the strike) is
terminated." But the employer by merely declaring that the strikers
are fired cannot terminate the relation or the strike.4"
Some courts have held that a strike is over when the employer is
operating his business in a "normal and usual manner."4 Others have
viewed the strike as terminated when "there are no reasonable grounds
for believing that a continuance thereof will materially affect his
business even though picketing and persuasion of others to keep away
from such employment still continues."46 A Massachusetts court has
said that a strike is terminated when most of the strikers have found
employment elsewhere,47 but there is some indication in this and a sub-
sequent Massachusetts holding4" that all of the places must be filled and
the business of the employer must be continuing in a normal and usual
manner. A New York court decided that a strike had ended when the
places of the strikers had been filled with efficient help and the strike
was merely "nominal." 49 Other courts have included the criterion that
the places must be filled with competent or efficient help. 0
A Wisconsin statute codifies a test which is likely to extend the legal
life of the strike over the longest period. 5' "A strike or lockout shall be
deemed to exist as long as the concomitants of a strike or lockout exist;
or unemployment on the part of the workers affected continues; or the
payment of strike benefits is being made; or publication is being made of
the existence of such strike or lockout." This statute makes the existence
or non-existence of a strike "turn upon whether the union has or has
not given up the struggle. 5 -
The termination issue doesn't seem to have been placed squarely
'Mooresville Cotton Mills v. N.L.R.B., a N.L.R.B. 539 (1936).
" Densten Hair Co. v. United Leather Workers' Union, 237 Mass. 199, xz8 N.E.
450 (1921).
's Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland Co., 263 Fed. 171 (D.C., Ohio, 1919).
"West Allis-Foundry Co. v. State, 186 Wis. 24, 2oz N.W. 30Z (1925).
,1 M. Steinert & Sons v. Tagen, 207 Mass. 394, 93 N.E. 584, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.)
l013 (1911).
"Moore Drop Forging Co. v. McCarthy, 243 Mass. 554, 562 (1923); and see
x Lab. Rel. Rep. 515 (1937).
"Yates Hotel Co. v. Meyers, 195 N.Y. Supp. 558 (I922).
OAllen v. Cutters and Butchers, (Cal. Super. Ct. for Los Angeles) x Lab. Rel. Rep.
324. (937); Mode Novelty Co. v. Taylor (N.J. Ch. Ct.) i Lab. Rel. Rep. S1s (1937)-
"See Wis. STAT., 5927, sec. 103.34.
'WiTrE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DisPuTEs (1932) p. i8, n. i; FRANs5FURTER
AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, p. 174, n. x6z. And cf. West Allis-Foundry Co.
v. State, supra, n. 46.
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before an Ohio court. But if the language of two Ohio cases"3 be
applied, the employees' reasonable expectation of re-employment appears
the probable test. So long as such a reasonable expectation existed the
strike would continue.
Rules which may be abstracted from the strike cases do not con-
stitute as sound a basis for prediction as their logical pattern might
indicate. Some of the criteria, particularly in the termination cases, are
descriptive of the case in issue and couched in language which gives them
the color of essential requirements. But careful examination yields the
idea that in many instances the elements of the strike described are not
essential to the holding, but are simply permitted by the peculiar facts
of the case. 4 With litigation in the strike area increasing in volume
and importance, existing cases are useful for the broad outlines they have
sketched. The fine lines of the strike concept are being drawn by care-
fully reasoned opinions in current cases." R. M. A.
LEGISLATION
THE SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT OF 1940.
On October 17, 1940, the Federal Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 194 o' became effective. This act applies to all persons on active
duty on that date and to all who enter the service before May 15, 1945,
unless the United States is then engaged in a war, in which event the act
shall remain effective until six months after a peace treaty has been
proclaimed by the President.2 Much of the act is the same as the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1918. What effect does the
new act have? What is its purpose? How does it work? What must
the man in the service do in order to enjoy its benefits? It is the purpose
of this comment to state in as concise a manner as the subject permits
the effect of this law.
Purpose
The act in no way cancels or annuls any debts or obligations; its
primary purposes are (a) to provide for a suspension of due dates on
obligations until the man in the service has had a sufficient time to
' Park Hotel v. Union, supra, n. 32; Hamilton Tailoring Co. v. Clothing Workers,
supra, n. 31.4 Supra, notes 47 and 48.
reUnited States Coal Co. v. Board of Review, supra, n. 13.
1 U.S.C.A., Title So, Apx. secs. So-585 inc. For a discussion of the Act's constitu-
tionality, see A.B.A.J. for Jan. 5, 194, at p. 23, and 2 WASH. & L. L. Rsv. i at 34-
, Sees. sor (i) (z), 604.
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